道德相對主義

在哲學中，道德相對主義是一種立場，認為道德或倫理並不反映客觀或普遍的道德真理，而主張社會、文化、歷史或個人境遇的相對主義。道德相對主義者與道德普遍主義相反，堅持不存在評價倫理道德的普遍標準。相對主義立場認為道德價值只適用於特定文化邊界內，或個人選擇的前後關係。極端的相對主義立場提議其他個人或團體的道德判斷或行為沒有任何意義。

一些道德相對主義者，例如存在主義者讓-保羅·薩特堅持個人的、主觀的「道德核心」（moral core）應該成為個體道德行為的基礎。公共道德反映社會習俗，只有個人的、主觀的道德表達真正的本真（Authenticity）。

對道德相對主義的審視

科學觀點

一些演化生物學家認為道德相對主義是自然選擇導致的結果。在這種情況下，道德被定義為一些能夠促進物種生存和繁殖的社會實踐。

哲學觀點

道德相對主義與道德普遍主義（moral universalism）觀點相對，如世界人權宣言就是道德普遍主義實踐。同時道德相對主義與道德客觀主義（moral objectivism）、道德現實主義（moral realism）和道德自然主義（moral naturalism）相區別。

道德革命

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Many people in other times and places thought slavery, for example, acceptable, even good; while most today view it as a great evil. Many writers and thinkers have held that one can justify any number of evils based on subjective or cultural preferences, and that morality requires some universal standard against which to measure ethical judgments. A moral relativist might respond that this criticism is only valid if one already accepts that such acts are indeed fundamentally evil - a position which the moral relativist would deny - and that the objection is therefore nothing other than an uncritical statement that morals are in fact absolute.

However, if it is their society that has, for instance, rejected slavery, they presumably agree that it is wrong, if their position is one of social or cultural moral relativism. This presents a meta-ethical problem in explaining what happens when a society has a collective change of heart. Consider the case of someone who has minority moral views within their society, and yet is vindicated (even relativistically) by future developments. If "right" and "wrong" literally mean "what my society accepts/rejects" then a social moral relativist in a slave-owning society of the past who says "slavery is wrong" is effectively saying "slavery is not approved of by my society", which is false — factually false. Yet, the relativist of the present is committed to agreeing with the relativist of the past, since they both oppose slavery.

The argument was phrased in terms of cultural relativism, but a similar argument applies to subjectivism. It is difficult for a moral subjectivist to claim that they have undergone any personal moral improvement, or that an attitude they used hold was wrong, when it was obviously what they felt was right at the time. For them, there is no external standard to judge against, so while their attitudes change, they cannot be said to improve or decline. It therefore seems that there is a difference in what can be expressed or justified between an objectivist and a relativist, although whether it involves the loss of anything worthwhile is open to debate.

早期歷史階段的人類社會曾經接受，甚至推崇奴隸制度，但現在若仍持如是觀點，則冒天下之大不韙。很多作家和思想家相信，在特定的主觀偏好或者文化習慣下，不論何種惡行，都可能自圓其說；道德的確立則要依託於普世價值，唯其如此，方能做出道德維度的審判。道德相對主義者或許會承認這樣的論調，但要讓人接受有些惡行在根本上就是惡的，則無法接受；他們認為，這樣的批評本質上僅僅是對道德的絕對性的隨聲附和。

而倘若是「他們」的社會，比方說，拒絕了奴隸制度，則想必多數人認為奴隸制是錯的，如果這個社會承認社會、文化、和道德的相對性。要解釋一個社會集體性的態度轉變，就是元倫理學層面的問題。試想，一個社會裏持有少數派觀點的人，可能會被後來未來發展後的社會平反（即使也是相對意義上的）。倘若「對」與「錯」僅僅在字面意義上代表「我身處的社會接受/反對什麼」，那一個生活在歷史上奴隸社會的道德相對主義者若說「奴隸制是錯的」，則實際上是在說「奴隸制在我身處的社會不被允許」---這樣的結論卻是錯的，錯在違背了歷史事實。然而一個生活在當代社會的相對主義者則完全同意曾經的相對主義者，因為他們都反對奴隸制。

雖說該論點以文化道德主義的語言陳述，但相似的論點同樣適用於主觀主義。對於一個道德主觀主義者，很難說他們經歷過任何道德上的進步；在特定的歷史階段的允許下，也很難說他們的哪種態度和感受是錯的。對他們而言，由於缺乏外在的判斷標準，即便是他們對於某一問題的態度有所轉變，也不能說他們是進步了還是退步了。因此，客觀主義者和主觀主義者對於什麼可以被表達，什麼可以自圓其說，貌似存在着分歧---至於是否有任何有價值的地方被二者忽視，則尚可討論。

Drawing boundaries

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There are also difficulties in putting a boundary upon "society" or "culture" - what people feel to be their social or cultural groupings may well not align with legal and national groupings. The person holding "minority moral views within their society" may consider their "culture" more aligned with that minority than with the larger state or national society which determines what is lawfully acceptable,. This can be seen, for instance, where religious communities within a nation or state hold views on the morality of issues such as abortion or homosexuality which differ from the current legal position on those issues. This flexibility could lead to the objection that cultural moral relativism is "anything goes", since one could find — or found — a society that condones whatever one wishes to do.

The equivalent of such gerrymandering in subjective or personal moral relativism would be for an individual to adopt different principles at different times, which would lead to a very acute form of "anything goes", unless forestalled by a meta-ethical principles that individuals need to be self-consistent. It could be argued that jumping ship in this way is dishonest, but the ethical acceptability of honesty is presumably as relative as anything else if relativism is true.

元倫理學

元倫理學（英語：meta-ethics）是倫理學的一個分支，以倫理學本身作為其研究對象。元倫理學起源於20世紀初，喬治·愛德華·摩爾於1903年發表的《倫理學原理》宣告了元倫理學的誕生。之後，元倫理學取代了實踐倫理學和規範倫理學成為了西方倫理學的主流，直至1970年代為止。[1]

現代元倫理學有各種不同的流派。包括以喬治·愛德華·摩爾、哈羅德·亞瑟·普里查德（Harold Arthur Prichard）、W·D·羅斯（W. D. Ross）等為代表的直覺主義；以伯特蘭·羅素、路德維希·維特根斯坦、維也納學派等為代表的情感主義；還有以斯蒂芬·圖爾敏（Stephen Toulmin）、R·M·黑爾（R. M. Hare）等為代表的規定主義。

理查德·默文·黑爾

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Some philosophers, for example R. M. Hare (1919 – 2002), argue that moral propositions remain subject to logical rules, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content, including those subject to cultural or religious standards or norms. Thus, for example, they contend that one cannot hold contradictory ethical judgments. This allows for moral discourse with shared standards, notwithstanding the descriptive properties or truth conditions of moral terms. They do not affirm or deny that moral facts exist, only that logic applies to our moral assertions; consequently, they postulate an objective and preferred standard of moral justification, albeit in a very limited sense. Nevertheless, according to Hare, logic shows the error of relativism in one very important sense (see Hare's Sorting out Ethics). Hare and other philosophers also point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This parallels our treatment of other terms such as less or more, which meet with universal understanding and do not depend upon independent standards (for example, one can convert measurements). It applies to good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too; for example, when we say, "this is a good wrench" or "this is a bad wheel". This evaluative property of certain terms also allows people of different beliefs to have meaningful discussions on moral questions, even though they may disagree about certain "facts".

卡爾·馬克思

一些人將卡爾·馬克思（1818 – 1883）作為道德相對主義的典型。他宣稱每個社會的道德體系完全是其生產方式和階級結構的產物。他相信統治階級的利益將成為社會的佔優勢的道德體系。

弗里德里希·尼采

主條目：觀點主義

弗里德里希·尼采認為道德是二元論概念帶給人們、又由教會繼續維持的一個錯誤思想。他一生的任務，就是重新評估所有價值，把人類思想從這些錯誤拯救出來。他預想未來個體將自然地行動，充分利用他們的天賦潛力或權利慾（der Wille zur Macht）。他相信人類只有通過開始自然地、本能地、根據每個個人的願望和動力行動，才會前進，實現這潛力。Übermensch將呈現強壯、有力、自然和快樂的結果。快樂（「力量增長、阻力被克服的感覺」）將自然出現。尼采希望通過人類動力「再自然化」來準備人類成長的土壤。他相信，一旦人們擺脫道德（以及協會、宗教），下一代人將會不受污染地、自由地、強壯地成長。（見《善惡的彼岸》、《偶像的黃昏》、《敵基督》等）。

宗教的觀點

道德相對主義不可避免地反對幾乎世界所有宗教所教導的絕對道德。

佛教

佛教在基本教義三法印中提出諸行無常的概念，意思是指，這個世界上的一切存在，其存在的根據皆是依賴於其他的因素。因此，所有的一切皆是無常、生滅的，世界上並不具有一個獨立自存而永恆、不變的實體。於如此立場下，道德法則也可被理解為依賴於其他因素而存在，並因此不具備絕對的本質、價值。

參見

• 分析哲學
• 人類學
• 商業道德
• 文化相對主義
• 道義論
• 動機說
• 倫理學
• Factual relativism
• Global justice
• 柯爾伯格道德發展階段
• 邏輯學
• 元倫理學
• 哈曼道德倫理學
• 道德規範
• 良知消費
• 道德普遍主義
• 道德
• 哲學
• 相對主義
• 性倫理
• 境遇倫理學
• 主觀主義
• Veritatis Splendor
• 適者生存
• 社會達爾文主義
• 描述倫理相對主義

參考文獻

書目

• Kurt Baier, "Difficulties in the Emotive-Imperative Theory" in Paul W Taylor (editor): The Moral Judgement: Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963
• Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Mentor)
• Panayot Butchvarov, "Skepticism in Ethics" (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1989).
• Ronald F. Duska, "What's the Point of a Business Ethics Course?", 1 Business Ethics Quarterly 335-352(1991), reprinted in Sterling Harwood, ed., Business as Ethical and Business as Usual (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 11-21.
• R.M. Hare, Sorting out Ethics (Oxford University Press)
• Gilbert Harman & Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell Publishing), 1996.
• Sterling Harwood, "Taking Ethics Seriously -- Moral Relativism versus Moral Realism" in Sterling Harwood, ed., Business as Ethical and Business as Usual (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 2-4.
• Sterling Harwood, "Against MacIntyre's Relativistic Communitarianism" in Sterling Harwood, ed., Business as Ethical and Business as Usual (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 5-10.
• David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford University Press)
• G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press)
• Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism" in Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (World Publishing Company)
• Leo Strauss, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (University of Chicago Press)
• Edward Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas Macmillan, 1906.
• Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard University Press)
• David B. Wong, Moral Relativity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), 248 pages.

外部連結

• Arguments for and against moral relativism （頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館）
• Objectivism and Relativism （頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館）
• Moral Relativism （頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館） - a Christian perspective.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry （頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館）
• Moral Relativism debate guide
• Online Interview: Moral Relativism & the Perversion of American Values