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用戶:Sayonzei/安哥拉獨立戰爭

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安哥拉獨立戰爭
葡萄牙殖民地戰爭、非洲的非殖民化、冷戰的一部分

在安哥拉巡邏的葡萄牙軍隊
日期1961年2月4日 – 1974年4月25日（停火）
（13年2個月又3周）
1975年11月11日（獨立）
地點
安哥拉
結果

葡萄牙軍事上勝利

安人運、安解陣、安盟政治上勝利

參戰方
安人運
安解陣
安盟
卡賓達飛地解放陣線（英語：Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）		 葡萄牙 葡萄牙
 南非[1][2]
物資支持：
指揮官與領導者
阿戈什蒂紐·內圖
Lúcio Lara（英語：Lúcio Lara）
奧爾登·羅貝托
若納斯·薩文比		 葡萄牙 弗朗西斯科·達科斯塔·戈麥斯
兵力
90,000 65,000
傷亡與損失
大約10,000人喪生[20] 2,991人喪生（1,526人陣亡，1,465人非戰鬥死亡）[21]（葡萄牙政府統計數據）
9,000+受傷（其他來源）
4,684人永久殘疾
30,000–50,000名平民喪生[22]
安哥拉目前的省份劃分，與葡萄牙殖民時期基本相同。

安哥拉獨立戰爭（葡萄牙語：Guerra de Independência de Angola；1961–1974），安哥拉稱為Luta Armada de Libertação Nacional（「民族解放武裝鬥爭」），[23][24]源於棉花種植場工人反抗強迫耕作的起義，後擴大為三個民族主義組織和一個分離主義組織爭奪安哥拉海外省控制權的多派別戰爭。[25]1974年4月葡萄牙發生康乃馨革命，推翻「新國家」政府，新政府隨即停止所有在非洲殖民地的軍事行動，並允許其獨立，安哥拉獨立戰爭因此結束。這場衝突常被視作葡萄牙海外戰爭的一個戰區，與幾內亞比紹獨立戰爭（英語：Guinea-Bissau War of Independence）和莫桑比克獨立戰爭並列。

安哥拉獨立戰爭是一場游擊戰爭，葡萄牙軍隊試圖對分散在安哥拉廣大人口稀少農村的各路武裝組織進行「平叛」。[26]各派武裝力量都在戰爭中犯下暴行。康乃馨革命發生前，葡萄牙軍隊已取得全面勝利，控制了安哥拉大部分地方。葡萄牙政府停戰後，各民族主義組織間又爆發了武裝衝突。最終於1975年1月，葡萄牙政府和安人運、安解陣、安盟簽訂了阿爾沃協議（英語：Alvor Agreement）。

背景

主條目：安哥拉歷史和葡屬西非

1482年，葡萄牙國王名下，由迪奧戈·康率領的帆船隊到達了剛果王國。隨後陸續有船隊到剛果，兩國的關係因此加深。葡萄牙人給剛果帶來火器、新技術和基督教，剛果則給葡萄牙人送去奴隸、象牙和礦產。

1575年保羅·迪亞士·德·諾發伊斯建立了現在的羅安達，當時稱 São Paulo da Assunção de Loanda（「聖保羅-阿松桑的羅安達」）。諾發伊斯帶領一百戶殖民者和四百名士兵佔有一塊土地，建起一座帶防禦工事的定居點。1605年葡萄牙皇家授予羅安達城市地位。後來葡萄牙陸續又建立一些居民點、要塞和港口，如1587年建立、1617年成鎮的本格拉，也是葡萄牙早期的重要居民點。[27][28]

葡萄牙入侵初期，不時有和當地統治者之間發生戰爭、衝突或簽訂條約，這其中尤其以持續抵抗葡萄牙人入侵的恩津加女王最為突出。佔領現在安哥拉全境的行動從19世紀開始，一直到20世紀20年代才完成。

1834年，安哥拉和其他葡萄牙海外領地獲得海外省地位。從此在葡萄牙官方立場下，安哥拉等地和本土各省一樣，是葡萄牙「不可分割的一部分」。1926-1951年，安哥拉的地位變更為「殖民地」（其本身又下分幾個省），1951年6月11日恢復海外省地位。1971年葡萄牙憲法修訂，賦予安哥拉更大的自治權，使其成為「安哥拉州」。[27][28]

雖然安哥拉的面積相當於法國和德國之和，但其人口密度很低，1960年總人口僅約500萬，其中18萬為白人，5.5萬為混血人種，其他為黑人。20世紀70年代，安哥拉人口增至565萬，其中45萬為白人，6.5萬為混血人種，其他為黑人。而根據政治學家Gerald Bender的數據，「……1974年末安哥拉的白人總數約為335,000，或稍比報告數字的一半要多。」[29]

安哥拉殖民政府由總督領導，總督兼有立法權和行政權，並直接對葡萄牙海外事務部負責。總督由內閣輔助，內閣由秘書長（擔任副總督）和另幾位省秘書組成。雖然總督負責管理警察和部隊，但其沒有軍權，而是由安哥拉武裝部隊總司令承擔。總司令直接對國防部長和武裝部隊總參謀負責。另有立法會，成員有政府直接任命，也有通過選舉產生，在20世紀60-70年代立法職責逐漸上升。1972年改組為安哥拉立法議會。此外還有政府委員會，成員包括該高級政府官員，負責就總督的立法和行政職責提出建議。

1961年，安哥拉分為以下區: 卡賓達、剛果、羅安達、北寬扎、南寬扎、馬蘭熱、隆達、本格拉、萬博、比耶-寬多-庫邦戈、莫希科、納米貝和威拉。1962年，剛果區分為扎伊爾和威熱兩區，比耶-寬多-庫邦戈區分為比耶和寬多-庫邦戈兩區。1970年，威拉區南部析出庫內內區。每一區由區長領導，區議會為輔助。和葡萄牙本土的地方政府類似，區內下設市鎮（concelho），再分為堂區（freguesias），分別由市議會（câmara municipal）和堂區議會（junta de freguesia）管理。在經濟社會發展不完全的地方，市鎮和堂區暫時以選區（circunscrições）和駐站（postos）代替，由政府任命官員管理。這些官員擁有較寬的權力，履行從行政、治安、衛生、經濟乃至司法等角色。選區和駐站的行政長官領導本土巡警隊。地方保留傳統的土王、酋長，並將其納入行政系統中，作為省政府與當地原住民之間的中間人。

交戰方

葡萄牙軍隊

 
安哥拉北部雨林中的葡萄牙傘兵

葡萄牙方參戰的主要為武裝部隊，也有安全部隊和準軍事部隊。

武裝部隊

駐安哥拉的葡萄牙武裝部隊包括陸軍、海軍和空軍，由安哥拉武裝部隊總司令指揮。1961年6月17日前還沒有任命總司令，戰爭初期的聯合指揮權由陸軍將領Monteiro Libório（到1961年6月）和Silva Freire（1961年6-9月）行使。此後總司令的職位分別由以下將領擔任：Venâncio Deslandes（1961–1962，兼任總督）、Holbeche Fino（1962–1963）、Andrade e Silva（1963–1965）、Soares Pereira（1965–1970）、弗朗西斯科·達科斯塔·戈麥斯（1970–1972）、Luz Cunha（1972–1974）和Franco Pinheiro（1974），除第一位出身空軍外，其他均來自陸軍。總司令擔任戰區指揮官，協調省內駐紮的三個軍種的部隊，各軍種指揮官擔任總司令助理。隨着衝突的發展，總司令及其參謀人員的行動作用日益加強。1968年，在總司令直接控制下，建立了負責登博斯平叛工作的第一軍區。從1970年起，各軍區也由他直接控制，東部軍區成為聯合指揮部。戰爭開始時，派駐安哥拉的葡萄牙武裝部隊僅有約6500人，其中1500人來自葡萄牙本土，其餘為當地士兵。而停戰時，這個數字增加到了超過6.5萬，葡萄牙人在武裝部隊中的比例也升至57.6%。

駐紮在安哥拉的葡萄牙地面部隊組成葡萄牙陸軍（英語：Portuguese Army）第三軍區（1962年更名為「安哥拉軍區」）。當時預計軍區將包括五個下屬的區域指揮部，但這些指揮部尚未啟動。衝突開始時安哥拉的陸軍部隊部署是在1953年確定的。原先駐安哥拉軍隊的組織形式是以分散在各地的連級單位為基礎，同時也執行國內安全任務。而當時葡萄牙不認為安哥拉內部會發生衝突，在軍事上主要的關切是在歐洲大陸可能會和華約組織發生常規戰爭，因此部署轉變為以三個步兵團和幾個營級單位為基礎，集中在主要城市中心，以便在發生常規戰爭時，能夠組建一個遠征野戰師，從安哥拉部署到歐洲增援葡萄牙軍隊。不過這些團和其他部隊大多是骨幹力量，作為省內應徵兵的訓練中心。在衝突期間，他們負責培養當地招募的野戰部隊。除了當地組建的部隊外，安哥拉的軍隊還包括從葡萄牙組建和派出的增援部隊。這些部隊均為過渡性質，大多數是義務兵（包括大部分尉官和士官），服役兩年期滿後即解散。絕大多數是輕步兵營和獨立連，稱為caçadores（葡萄牙語「獵人」之意）。These battalions and companies were designed to operate autonomously and isolated, without much support from the higher echelons, so having a strong service support component. They were deployed in a grid system (quadrícula) along the theatre of operations, with each one being responsible for a given area of responsibility. Usually, a regiment-sized agrupamento (battlegroup) commanded a sector, with this being divided in several sub-sectors, each constituting the area of responsibility of a caçadores battalion. Each battalion, in turn, had its field companies dispersed by the sub-sector, each with part of it as its area of responsibility. From 1962, four intervention zones (Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern) were established – renamed "military zones" in 1967 – each grouping several sectors. Due to the low scale guerrilla nature of the conflict, the caçadores company became the main tactical unit, with the standard organization in three rifle and one support platoons, being replaced by one based in four identical sub-units known as "combat groups". The Army also fielded regular units of artillery, armored reconnaissance, engineering, communications, signal intelligence, military police and service support. Besides the regular units, the Army also fielded units of special forces. Initially, these consisted of companies of special caçadores, trained for guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare. The Army tried to extend the training of the special caçadores to all the light infantry units, so disbanding those companies in 1962. These proved however impracticable and soon other special forces were raised again in the form of the Commandos. The Commandos and a few specially selected caçadores units were not deployed in grid, but served instead as mobile intervention units under the direct control of the higher echelons of command. An unconventional force also fielded by Army was the Dragoons of Angola, a special counterinsurgency horse unit raised in the middle 1960s.

葡萄牙海軍（英語：Portuguese Navy）部隊由安哥拉海軍司令部指揮，包括扎伊爾船隊（有巡邏艇和登陸艇，在扎伊爾河活動）、直屬船隊（包括輪流部署於安哥拉的護衛艦），海軍陸戰隊連和特種部隊分隊。海軍陸戰隊連主要負責保護海軍設施和艦艇，特種部隊則專門進行兩棲攻擊。衝突之初，海軍的主要着眼點在扎伊爾河，防止安哥拉北部的游擊隊從扎伊爾邊境地區滲透入境。後來，海軍也開始在遠離大洋的東安哥拉河流中活動。

 
葡萄牙空軍的一架SA330美洲獅直升機
 
20世紀60年代，羅安達空軍基地，一架裝載軍需物資的葡萄牙F-84戰鬥機
 
葡萄牙空軍的一架F-84戰鬥機

駐安哥拉的葡萄牙空軍由第二軍區指揮，總部設在羅安達。旗下有一個中央基地（羅安達的九號基地）和兩個分基地（威熱省內加熱的三號基地和隆達省卡瓦略的四號基地）。寬多-庫邦戈省塞爾帕平托的十號基地直到戰爭結束前才完工。基地控制下屬的小機場，包括機動機場和備用機場。除此之外，空軍也擁有一些其他的機場，如陸軍衛戍區的機場，部分機場長期部署有空軍分隊。空軍在安哥拉還安排有作為機動干預部隊的空降兵二十一營，原是降落傘空降作戰，後來改使用直升機進行空中攻擊。The Air Force was supported by the voluntary air formations, composed of civil pilots, mainly from local flying clubs, who operated light aircraft mainly in air logistics support missions. In the beginning of the conflict, the Air Force had only a few aircraft stationed in Angola, including 25 F-84G jet fighter-bombers, six PV-2 Harpoon bombers, six Nord Noratlas transport aircraft, six Alouette II helicopters, eight T-6 light attack aircraft and eight Auster light observation aircraft. By the early 1970s, it had available four F-84G, six PV-2 Harpoon, 13 Nord Noratlas, C-47 and C-57 transport aircraft, 30 Alouette III and Puma helicopters, 18 T-6 and 26 Dornier Do 27 observation aircraft. Despite the increase, the number of aircraft was always too few to cover the enormous Angolan territory, besides many being old aircraft difficult to maintain in flying conditions. From the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces in southern Angola were able to count with the support of helicopters and some other air assets of the South African Air Force, with two Portuguese-South African joint air support centers being established.

安全部隊

The security forces in Angola were under the control of the civil authorities, headed by the Governor-General of the province. The main of these forces engaged in the war was the Public Security Police (PSP) and the PIDE (renamed DGS in 1969). By the middle of the 1960s, these forces included 10,000 PSP constables and 1,100 PIDE agents.

The PSP was the uniformed preventive police of Angola. It was modeled after the European Portuguese PSP, but it covered the whole territory of the province, including its rural areas and not only the major urban areas as in the European Portugal. The PSP of Angola included a general-command in Luanda and district commands in each of the several district capitals, with a network of police stations and posts scattered along the territory. The Angolan PSP was reinforced with mobile police companies deployed by the European Portuguese PSP. The PSP also included the Rural Guard, which was responsible for the protection of farms and other agricultural companies. Besides this, the PSP was responsible to frame the district militias, which were employed mainly in the self-defense of villages and other settlements.

The PIDE (International and State Defense Police) was the Portuguese secret and border police. The PIDE Delegation of Angola, included a number of sub-delegations, border posts and surveillance posts. In the war, it operated as an intelligence service. The PIDE raised and controlled the Flechas, a paramilitary unit of special forces made up of natives. The Flechas were initially intended to serve mostly as trackers, but due to their effectiveness they were increasingly employed in more offensive operations, including pseudo-terrorist operations.

準軍事部隊和非常規部隊

除了正規武裝部隊和安全部隊外，葡萄牙方面還有準軍事部隊和非常規部隊。有些受軍方控制，其他的為安哥拉當局掌控。

The OPVDCA (Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defense of Angola) was a militia-type corps responsible for internal security and civil defense roles, with similar characteristics to those of the Portuguese Legion existing in European Portugal. It was under the direct control of the Governor-General of the province. Its origins was the Corps of Volunteers organized in the beginning of the conflict, which became the Provincial Organization of Volunteers in 1962, assuming also the role of civil defense in 1964, when it became the OPVDCA. It was made up of volunteers that served in part-time, most of these being initially whites, but latter becoming increasingly multi-racial. In the conflict, the OPVDCA was mainly employed in the defense of people, lines of communications and sensitive installations. It included a central provincial command and a district command in each of the Angolan districts. It is estimated that by the end of the conflict there were 20,000 OPVDCA volunteers.[來源請求]

The irregular paramilitary forces, included a number of different types of units, with different characteristics. Under military control, were the Special Groups (GE) and the Special Troops (TE). The GE were platoon-sized combat groups of special forces made up of native volunteers, that operated in Eastern Angola, usually attached to Army units. The TE had similar characteristics, but were made up of defectors from FNLA, operating in Cabinda and Northern Angola. Under the control of the civil authorities were the Fieis (Faithfuls) and the Leais (Loyals). The Fieis was a force made up mostly of exiled Katangese gendarmes from the Front for Congolese National Liberation, that opposed Mobutu regime, being organized in three battalions. The Leais was a force made up of political exiles from Zambia.

葡萄牙武裝部隊的種族、民族成分

從20世紀初到50年代，葡萄牙在其非洲屬地維持着較為獨立的殖民軍隊，主要由「本地軍團」（companhias indígenas）組成。軍官和高級士官來自葡萄牙本土軍隊，下級士官則從這些海外領地的葡萄牙移民中選拔。普通士兵的來源分為黑人志願兵和白人義務兵。理論上「葡化」黑人也應入伍，但實際上只有少數人得到徵召。[30]自1951年殖民地的身份變為海外省後，殖民軍隊失去了其單獨地位，併入葡萄牙常規軍，但海外省軍隊的招募、訓練等沒有太大改變。

根據莫桑比克歷史學家若昂·保羅·博爾赫斯·科埃略（João Paulo Borges Coelho）的說法，[31]葡萄牙軍隊是按照種族和民族進行隔離的。到1960年，葡萄牙軍隊中有三類士兵：commissioned soldiers (European and African whites), overseas soldiers (black African assimilados or civilizados), and native soldiers (Africans who were part of the indigenato regime). These categories were renamed to 1st, 2nd and 3rd class in 1960 – which effectively corresponded to the same classification. Later, although skin colour ceased to be an official discrimination, in practice the system changed little – although from the late 1960s onward blacks were admitted as ensigns (alferes), the lowest rank in the hierarchy of commissioned officers.[32]

衝突爆發之初，黑人在殖民軍士兵中的佔比只有18%，戰爭中最高曾達到41%。科埃略指出，在安哥拉、幾內亞和莫桑比克三國，葡萄牙指揮官對非洲士兵的看法差異很大。戈麥斯尋求與當地民眾建立良好關係，將非洲士兵納入正式的反叛亂作戰編制中。相比之下，斯皮諾拉則希望在徵召非洲士兵時，能夠在政治及社會心理層面上有所作用。考爾扎在這三位中最為保守，他害怕非洲軍團脫離他的控制，思想上也沒有擺脫把非洲人視作低等生物的種族主義觀念。[32]

Native African troops, although widely deployed, were initially employed in subordinate roles as enlisted troops or noncommissioned officers. As the war went on, an increasing number of native Angolans rose to positions of command, though of junior rank. After 500 years of colonial rule, Portugal had failed to produce any native black governors, headmasters, police inspectors, or professors; it had also failed to produce a single commander of senior commissioned rank in the overseas Army.

Here Portuguese colonial administrators fell victim to the legacy of their own discriminatory and limited policies in education, which largely barred indigenous Angolans from an equal and adequate education until well after the outbreak of the insurgency. By the early 1970s, the Portuguese authorities had fully perceived these flaws as wrong and contrary to their overseas ambitions in Portuguese Africa, and willingly accepted a true color blindness policy with more spending in education and training opportunities, which started to produce a larger number of black high ranked professionals, including military personnel.[來源請求]

民族主義和分離主義組織

安哥拉人民聯盟/安解陣

主條目：安哥拉民族解放陣線

安解陣的前身「北安哥拉人民聯盟」由奧爾登·羅貝托創建於1954年7月7日。羅貝托是古剛果王室後裔，出生於北安哥拉，自幼生活在比屬剛果，並在當地的殖民當局工作。1958年該組織更名為「安哥拉人民聯盟」（UPA）。1960年，羅貝托與安人運簽訂協議，兩派共同對抗葡萄牙軍隊，但實際上沒能實現。1962年，安哥拉人民聯盟與安哥拉民主黨合併，成立安哥拉民族解放陣線（FNLA，簡稱安解陣），持親美反蘇立場。同年創立安哥拉流亡革命政府（英語：Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile）（GRAE）。安哥拉人民聯盟/安解陣受剛果人的支持。同時由於羅貝托和扎伊爾總統蒙博托·塞塞·塞科的親屬關係等原因，安解陣和比屬剛果/扎伊爾也有十分密切的關係。

安解陣下屬的軍事部隊稱為「安哥拉民族解放軍」（ELNA），主要支援來自剛果/扎伊爾，軍隊也在扎伊爾接受訓練。此外，阿爾及利亞、美國也對其提供支持。雖然安解陣反共，但東歐國家也給其提供過不少武器。

安人運

主條目：安哥拉人民解放運動

安哥拉人民解放運動（安人運，MPLA）成立於1956年，是安哥拉非洲人聯合鬥爭黨（PLUA）和安哥拉共產黨（PCA）合併而來。安人運是左翼政黨，成員主要是安哥拉的混血、白人知識階層和城市精英。支持者來自安本杜人和羅安達、本戈、南北寬扎、馬蘭熱等省份的部族。黨主席為阿戈什蒂紐·內圖，總書記是維里亞托·達克魯茲，兩人都是接受過葡萄牙教育的城市知識分子。國際上，安人運最大的支援來自蘇聯和古巴。原本其希望得到美國的援助，但由於美國的援助目標已經是安哥拉人民聯盟/安解陣而最終作罷。

安人運的武裝力量稱為「安哥拉人民解放軍」（EPLA），最多時人數達到4500人左右。裝備多為蘇式，通過贊比亞接收，包括有TT-33手槍、PPS衝鋒鎗、AVS-36自動步槍、AK-47突擊步槍、機槍、迫擊炮、火箭推進榴彈、反坦克地雷及反步兵地雷。

安盟

主條目：爭取安哥拉徹底獨立全國聯盟

爭取安哥拉徹底獨立全國聯盟（安盟，UNITA）由前安解陣成員若納斯·薩文比創立於1966年。薩文比出身安哥拉中南部的奧文本杜族，父親是一名福音派牧師。在安解陣期間，薩文比擔任安哥拉流亡革命政府外交部長，但後來他指責奧爾登·羅貝托勾結美國，雙方爆發分歧，最後薩文比出走。

安盟的軍事力量稱為安哥拉解放軍（英語：FALA）（FALA），但其人數少、裝備差，致使薩文比只能和葡萄牙當局合作，更注重於打擊安人運。戰爭結束時，安盟是唯一一個能在安哥拉本土維持軍事活動的本土組織，其他的軍事力量要麼被葡萄牙軍隊消滅，要麼出逃到了其他鄰國。

卡賓達飛地解放陣線

主條目：卡賓達飛地解放陣線

卡賓達飛地解放陣線（FLEC）創建於1963年，由原卡賓達飛地解放運動（英語：Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）（MLEC）、卡賓達民族聯盟行動委員會（英語：Action Committee of the Cabinda National Union）（CAUNC）和馬永貝民族聯盟（英語：Mayombe National Alliance）（ALLIAMA）合併而成。與前述三個組織不同，該組織的宗旨是將卡賓達飛地從安哥拉脫離出來成立獨立國家，而不是追求安哥拉全國獨立。卡賓達飛地解放陣線開始活動的時間早於葡萄牙撤出安哥拉，但其在軍事上的活動基本是在這之後，和安哥拉武裝、安全部隊間的衝突。卡賓達飛地解放陣線直到現今仍然作為游擊隊活躍在周邊地區。

東部叛亂武裝

東部叛亂武裝（RDL）was a dissident wing of the MPLA, created in 1973, under the leadership of Daniel Chipenda, in opposition to the line of Agostinho Neto. A second dissident wing was the Active Revolt, created at the same time.

戰前形勢

國際政治局勢

在20世紀40年代末、50年代初的亞非殖民地，主要的國際政治關係標誌是冷戰和「風向的改變」。

1954年10月，阿爾及爾的連環爆炸拉開了阿爾及利亞戰爭的帷幕。法國向阿爾及利亞派兵40萬，直到1962年戰爭結束。葡萄牙政府預見到將來其非洲屬地也會出現類似的戰爭，因此給予極大的關注，派人學習法國人採取的平叛戰術。

1955年，萬隆會議在印度尼西亞展開。與會的29個亞非國家中，大部分在當時都才成立不久。萬隆會議促進了亞非經濟和文化合作，聲明反對殖民主義和新殖民主義，這是向不結盟運動邁出的重要一步。

1955年12月，葡萄牙加入聯合國後，秘書長向葡萄牙政府正式詢問，其管轄範圍內是否有非自治領土。按照當時葡萄牙政府的立場，所有海外省和歐洲本土一樣，都是葡萄牙不可分割的一部分。因此葡萄牙政府的答覆是，葡萄牙沒有任何領土可以被定性為非自治領土，從而沒有義務提供《聯合國憲章》第七十三條所要求的任何信息。

1957年，夸梅·恩克魯瑪帶領前英國殖民地黃金海岸（今名加納）獨立，成為二戰後非洲第一個獨立的前殖民地。1958年恩克魯瑪推動的非洲獨立國家會議成為非洲反對殖民主義的一個新的信號。

安哥拉的北鄰比屬剛果於1960年獨立成為剛果共和國（「剛果（利）」，後稱「剛果（金）」，1971年後稱扎伊爾共和國），但獨立後不久即因為一系列的暴力騷亂導致出現了剛果危機。白人成為受打擊的目標，超過8萬名比利時裔居民被迫逃離剛果。莫伊茲·沖伯宣佈加丹加從剛果獨立。這場危機引起了聯合國和比利時軍隊的干預，直到1965年蒙博托·塞塞·塞科上台後，剛果局勢才緩和下來。

1961年1月20日，約翰甘迺迪就任美國總統。其政府開始支持非洲的民族主義運動，目的是中和蘇聯在非洲日益增長的影響。在安哥拉問題上，美國開始對安哥拉人民聯盟給予直接支持，並對葡萄牙採取敵對態度，禁止葡萄牙在非洲使用美國武器。

1964年，肯尼思·卡翁達領導下的北羅德西亞獨立成為贊比亞。至此，除西南非洲以外, 安哥拉已基本被與葡萄牙政權敵對的國家包圍。

安哥拉國內政治情況和民族主義的興起

 
現代非洲地圖，安哥拉被標紅

葡萄牙政府於1933年6月16日通過《葡萄牙殖民法案（英語：Portuguese Colonial Act）》，規定了各海外屬地與本土之間的關係，1951年該法案被廢除。法案反映了20世紀20年代末至30年代歐洲殖民國家對海外領地的普遍看法。法案生效期間，各海外屬地失去了自1834年取得的「省」地位，改為「殖民地」，整個葡萄牙正式成為「葡萄牙殖民帝國」。《殖民法案》承認了葡萄牙人對各海外領地原住民的至高無上的地位，原住民雖然也能接受各種教育，但大多數傳統原住民社區和生活在安哥拉的葡萄牙人之間存在着深刻的文化和社會差異，實際上明顯處於不利地位。

因其強烈的帝國主義傾向，《殖民法案》開始受到質疑。1944年，前殖民地事務部長何塞·費雷拉·博薩（英語：José Ferreira Bossa）建議修改法案，包括把「殖民地」的稱呼恢復成過去的「海外省」。1951年6月11日，葡萄牙國民議會通過了一項新法律，並最終否決了《殖民法案》。所有的原葡萄牙海外領地都恢復了省的地位，如安哥拉由原先的「安哥拉屬地」（Colónia de Angola）恢復為「安哥拉省」（Província de Angola）。[27][28]

1948年，維里亞托·達克魯茲等人創立弘揚安哥拉文化的組織「青年知識分子運動（英語：Movement of Young Intellectuals）」。此時安哥拉本土的民族主義者向聯合國致信，呼籲在聯合國監督下給予安哥拉保護國地位。

20世紀50年代，在薩拉查政府的鼓勵下，葡萄牙人掀起了新一輪在包括安哥拉海外省在內的葡屬非洲的定居浪潮。[33]

1953年，安哥拉分離主義者建立了第一個以安哥拉獨立為宗旨的政黨「安哥拉非洲人聯合鬥爭黨」（PLUA）。1954年，比屬剛果和安哥拉的剛果民族主義者創建了「北安哥拉人民聯盟」（UPA），推動原剛果王國地區的獨立。[34]

During 1955, Mário Pinto de Andrade and his brother Joaquim formed the Angolan Communist Party (PCA). In December 1956 PLUA merged with the PCA to form the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA, led by da Cruz, Mário Andrade, Ilidio Machado, and Lúcio Lara, derived support from the Ambundu and in Luanda.[35][36][37][38]

In March 1959, when inaugurating the new military shooting range of Luanda, the Governor-General of Angola, Sá Viana Rebelo, makes the famous Shooting Range Speech, where he predicts a possible conflict in Angola.

General Monteiro Libório assumes the command of the land forces of Angola, with prerogatives of commander-in-chief, in September 1959. He would be the Portuguese military commander in office when the conflict erupts.

Álvaro Silva Tavares assumes the office of Governor-General of Angola in January 1960, being the holder of the office when the conflict erupts.

During January 1961, Henrique Galvão, heading a group of operatives of the DRIL oppositionist movement, hijacked the Portuguese liner Santa Maria. The intention of Galvão was to set sail to Angola, where he would disembark and establish a rebel Portuguese government in opposition to Salazar, but he was forced to head to Brazil, where he liberated the crew and passengers in exchange for political asylum.

Feeling the need of having forces trained in counter-insurgency operations, the Portuguese Army creates the Special Operations Troops Centre in April 1960, where companies of special forces (baptized "special caçadores") start to be prepared. The first three companies of special caçadores (CCE) are dispatched to Angola in June 1960, mainly due to the Congo Crisis. Their main mission was to protect the Angolan regions bordering the ex-Belgian Congo, each being stationed in Cabinda (1st CCE), in Toto, Uíge (2nd CCE) and Malanje (3rd CCE).

卡桑傑起義

Although usually considered as an event that predates the Angolan War of Independence, some authors consider the Baixa de Cassanje revolt (also known as the "Maria's War") as the initial event of that Conflict. It was a labour conflict, not related with the claiming for the independence of Angola. The Baixa do Cassanje was a rich agricultural region of the Malanje District, bordering the ex-Belgian Congo, with approximately the size of the Mainland Portugal, which was the origin of most of the cotton production of Angola. The region's cotton fields were in the hands of the Cotonang - General Company of the Cottons of Angola, a company mostly held by Belgian capital and which employed many natives. Despite its contribution for the development of the region, Cotonang had been accused several times of disrespecting the labour legislation regarding working conditions of its employees, causing it to become under the investigation of the Portuguese authorities, but with no relevant actions against it being yet taken.

Feeling discontent with Cotonang, in December 1960, many of its workers started to boycott work, demanding better working conditions and higher wages. The discontent was seized by infiltrated indoctrinators of the Congolese PSA (African Solidarity Party) to foment an uprising of the local peoples. At that time, the only Portuguese Army unit stationed in the region was the 3rd Special Caçadores Company (3rd CCE), tasked with the patrolling and protection of the border with the ex-Belgian Congo. Despite receiving complains from local whites who felt their security threatened, the Governor of the Malanje District, Júlio Monteiro – a mixed race Cape Verdean – did not authorize the 3rd CCE to act against the rebels and also forbade the acquisition of self-defense weapons by the white population. From 9 to 11 January 1961, the situation worsened, with the murder of a mixed race Cotonang foreman and with the surrounding of a 3rd CCE patrol by hundreds of rebels. Finally, on 2 February, the clashes between the rebels and the security forces erupted, with the first shots being fired, causing 11 deaths. By that time, the uprising had spread to the whole Malanje District and threatened to spread to the neighboring districts. The rebel leaders took advantage of the superstitious beliefs of most of their followers to convince them that the bullets of the Portuguese military forces were made of water and so could do no harm. Presumably due to this belief, the rebels, armed with machetes and canhangulos (home-made shotguns), attacked the military en masse, in the open field, without concern for their own protection, falling under the fire of the troops.

Given the limitations of the 3rd CCE to deal with the uprising in such a large region, the Command of the 3rd Military Region in Luanda decided to organize an operation with a stronger military force to subjugate it. A provisional battalion under the command of Major Rebocho Vaz was organized by the Luanda Infantry Regiment, integrating the 3rd CCE, the 4th CCE (stationed in Luanda) and the 5th CCE (that was still en route from the Metropole to Angola). On 4 February, the 4th CCE was already embarked in the train ready to be dispatched to Malanje, when an uprising at Luanda erupted, with several prisons and Police facilities being stormed. Despite the indefinite situation at Luanda and despite having few combat units available there, General Libório, commander of the 3rd Military Region decided to go forward with the sending of the 4th CCE to Malanje, which arrived there on 5 February. The provisional battalion started gradually the operations to subdue the uprising.

The land forces were supported by the Portuguese Air Force, which employed Auster light observation and PV-2 ground attack aircraft. The military forces were able to assume the control of the region by 11 February. By the 16th, the provisional battalion was finally reinforced with the 5th CCE which had been held in Luanda as a reserve force after disembarking in Angola. Baixa do Cassanje was officially considered pacified on 27 February. The anti-Portuguese forces claimed that, during the subduing of the uprising, the Portuguese military bombed villages in the area, using napalm and killing between 400 and 7000 natives. However, the Portuguese military reported that no napalm was ever used in the operations and that the number of rebels dead was inferior to 300, plus 100 registered injured treated at the Malanje Hospital. The military forces suffered two dead and four injured.

After the subdue of the uprising, the Portuguese military pressed the Government-General of Angola to take actions to improve the working conditions of the Cotonang employees in order to solve definitely the situation. The Governor-General Silva Tavares took measures to calm down the situation and on 2 May 1961, the Government decreed the change of the labor legislation related with cotton culture. Apparently, these measures were successful in deeply reducing the discontent among the laborers of the Baixa de Cassanje, with the region remaining peaceful even after the UPA attacks of 15 March 1961.[39][40][41]

2月4日及10日羅安達事件

關於1961年2月4日和10日事件的事實，由於各方的宣傳和信息的相互矛盾，仍有許多不清楚的地方。

At a time when Luanda was full of foreign journalists that were covering the possible arriving at Angola of the hijacked liner Santa Maria and with the Baixa de Casanje revolt on its peak, on the early morning of 4 February 1961, a number of black militants, mostly armed with machetes, ambushed a Public Security Police (PSP) patrol-car and stormed the Civil Jail of São Paulo, the Military Detection House and the PSP Mobile Company Barracks, with the apparent objective of freeing political prisoners that were being held in those facilities. They were not able to storm other planned targets like the Airport, the National Broadcast Station, post office and military barracks. Different sources indicate the number of militants evolved in the several attacks as being between 50 and several hundreds. The militants were able to kill the crew of the patrol-car, taking their weapons, but their assaults against the several facilities was repulsed, not being able to release any prisoners. In the assaults, the security forces suffered seven dead, including five white and one black police constables and a white Army corporal, besides having several seriously injured elements. Different sources indicate between 25 and 40 attackers killed.

The MPLA always officially claimed to be the originator of the attacks. However, the MPLA origin of the attacks is contested. Several sources indicate the Angolan nationalist mixed race priest Manuel das Neves as the perpetrator of the attacks. Apparently this was also the PIDE theory, which arrested and sent him to the Metropole, where he was interned in religious houses.

An emotional funeral for the deceased police constables was held on 5 February, which was attended by thousands of persons, the majority being white inhabitants of Luanda. During the funeral, riots broke out, which would cause additional dead. There are several contradictory versions of what happened. The anti-Portuguese line states that the riots were originated by the whites, who desired to revenge the dead police constables, committing random acts of violence against the ethnic black majority living in Luanda's slums (musseques).[42] Contrary versions state that the riots were caused when provocative shots were fired near the cemetery where the funeral was being held, causing panic among the attendants. The riots caused a number of dead, which number varies accordingly with the sources. The anti-Portuguese line describes a massacre carried away by the white inhabitants and the security forces, with hundreds of blacks being killed. Following this line of thought:

The Portuguese vengeance was awesome. The police helped civilian vigilantes organise nightly slaughters in the Luanda slums. The whites hauled Africans from their flimsy one-room huts, shot them and left their bodies in the streets. A Methodist missionary... testified that he personally knew of the deaths of almost three hundred.

——John Marcum[43]

However, other sources refer that the theory of the massacre is mere anti-Portuguese false propaganda and that only 19 persons died in the riots. Following this line:

During the funeral of the PSP constables, which reached a gigantic manifestation of grief, with the cemetery full of people, shots were heard outside that caused the widespread panic, especially in the interior, where people practically did not fit. In the ensuing confusion, and of the firing fired, resulted nineteen dead and numerous wounded, incident that gave rise to another myth of massacre, that would have reached hundreds of dead, wounded and imprisoned, completely false numbers. It must be said that many of these people were probably disarmed, even the force that was going to make the salvos of the order, to accompany the highest individualities of Luanda and that it was a military vehicle called on the occasion, that came to the place, and ended the generalized disorder. Also nobody explained, until today, who initiated these disturbances and fired the first shots.

——A.L. Pires Nunes[44]

2月10日，又發生一場針對聖保羅監獄的類似襲擊。不過這次安全部隊提前做好準備，無人死亡，還擊斃22名襲擊者。隨後也有其他相似的襲擊計劃，但都被安全部隊發現並破獲。

戰爭過程

開端

 
在羅安達參加閱兵的葡萄牙殖民軍隊
主條目：葡萄牙殖民地戰爭
 
安哥拉人民聯盟的徽章

On 15 March 1961, the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA), under the leadership of Holden Roberto, launched an incursion into northern Angola from its base in the Congo-Léopoldville (ex-Belgian Congo), leading 4000 to 5000 militants. His forces took farms, government outposts, and trading centers, killing and mutilating officials and civilians, most of them Ovimbundu "contract workers" from the Central Highlands. It was the start of the Angolan War of Independence and of the wider Portuguese Overseas War.[45] UPA militants stormed the Angolan districts of Zaire, Uíge, Cuanza Norte and Luanda, massacring the civilian population during their advance, killing 1,000 whites and 6,000 blacks (women and children included of both white European and black African descent). Besides the killing of people, the UPA militants destroyed the infrastructures they found on their way, including houses, farms, roads and bridges, creating a general chaos and panic. The terrified populations took refuge in the forests or fled to nearby regions and to Congo-Léopoldville.[38][46][47][48]

However and contrary to the expectations of the UPA, the majority of the white inhabitants that were able to survive the initial attacks did not flee, except some women and children that were evacuated to Luanda. Instead, they entrenched themselves in several towns and villages of the region – including Carmona, Negage, Sanza Pombo, Santa Cruz, Quimbele and Mucaba – resisting the assaults almost without the support of the few existent military forces.[49]

On the same 15 March and on the 16th, the 7th and the 9th Special Caçadores companies and the 1st Paratrooper Company are dispatched from the Metropole to Angola by air. Other small units of the same type are dispatched in the following days. Also, small military columns leave Luanda and Carmona to try to rescue some of the isolated populations of the areas under the UPA attacks. On 21 March, the Provisional Battalion of Major Rebocho Vaz – which has acted in the Baixa de Cassange revolt – moves to Cuanza Norte to face the UPA advances.

Without relevant military reinforcements arrived from the Metropole, on 28 March, the Corps of Volunteers of Angola is created, in order to officially frame the civil volunteers that were already fighting UPA.

On the early April, the Massacre of Cólua occurs. The village of Cólua, near Aldeia Viçosa, Uíge had been attacked and its inhabitants massacred by UPA. A military column from the Provisional Battalion is sent to the village to try to collect the dead bodies. However an isolated group of soldiers (including two officers) which remained behind is ambushed, with their bodies being latter found horribly mutilated. Another military patrol that was sent to the area is also ambushed, with some of their members falling into UPA's hands and being also tortured, mutilated and killed. 30 civilians and 11 military are eventually killed at Cólua. Later testimonies refer that the UPA militants practiced acts of cannibalism, eating parts of the dead bodies of the soldiers. The Cólua events had an important psychological effect in the Portuguese forces, not only due to horrifying acts practiced against its soldiers, but also because they realized that the insurgents now dared to attack military forces and not just defenseless civilians.[50]

On 11 April, the Minister of National Defense Júlio Botelho Moniz – discontent with the attitude of Prime Minister Salazar regarding the Overseas policy and the conflict in Angola – leads a coup d'état attempt, which however fails. Following the aborted coup and now realizing that the conflict in Angola was more serious than what was initially thought, Prime Minister Salazar dismisses Botelho Moniz and assumes himself the Defense portfolio. On 13 April, Salazar speaks on television about the situation in Angola, using the famous phrase Para Angola, rapidamente e em força (To Angola, rapidly and in force). As part of the Government remodeling, Adriano Moreira is appointed Overseas Minister, initiating a series of liberal reforms in the Portuguese Overseas territories.

A strong military mobilization is now initiated by the Portuguese Armed Forces. Finally, on 21 March, the first important military contingent from the Metropole (including the Caçadores battalions 88 and 92) embark in the ocean liner Niassa, arriving at Luanda on 2 May. The cargo ship Benguela also departs to Angola, carrying war material. In a demonstration of force, the military units recently arrived at Luanda parade along the main avenue of the city.

On 13 May, the units arrived from the Metropole start to move to Northern Angola, to occupy strategic positions. Until June, Army units are positioned in Damba, Sanza Pombo, São Salvador do Congo and Cuimba, while Fuzileiros (Marines) occupy Tomboco. Due to the blocked roads, destroyed bridges and ambushes, the movement of the units is slow, with the Portuguese forces suffering numerous casualties. After occupying these positions, the Portuguese units initiate the gradual re-occupation of the areas controlled by UPA.

In June, the Air Force General Augusto Venâncio Deslandes is appointed Governor-General of Angola, replacing Silva Tavares. Also, General António Libório is replaced by General Carlos Silva Freire in the role of commander of the 3rd Military Region (commander of land forces of Angola). General Silva Freire will maintain prerogatives of joint Commander-in-Chief until September, when Venâncio Deslandes is also appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Angola, accumulating this role with that of Governor-General.

On 10 July, the Portuguese forces initiate its first major operation of the conflict, this being Operation Viriato (Viriathus), aimed at re-conquering the town of Nambuangongo, in the Dembos forest, which had been proclaimed by UPA as its capital. The operation was still planned as a conventional-type maneuver, with Caçadores battalions 96 and 114 and Cavalry Squadron 149 converging in Nambuangongo through three axes of attack, with the support of artillery, engineering and air forces. On 9 August, the vanguard of the Battalion 96 of Lieutenant-Colonel Armando Maçanita finally arrives and re-occupies Nambuagongo. In their advance, the three military units suffer 75 casualties, including 21 dead.

The Portuguese forces now focus in the re-occupation of the village of Quipedro, in order to eliminate the rebellious forces in the area and to cut of their flight from Nambuangongo to the North, as a follow-up of Operation Viriato. For this, they will carry away Operation Nema, which will include the first airborne assault in combat of the Portuguese military history. The Operation is carried away between 11 and 21 August, with the 1st Company of the recently created Paratroopers Battalion 21 of Angola jumping by parachute over the target, after preparation air strikes. The rebellious were taken by surprise, with the Paratroopers being able to occupy Quipedro almost without resistance. They then built an improvised runway and waited for the arriving of Cavalry Squadron 149 that was advancing by land from Nambuangongo.

In August, by order of General Silva Freire, the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) is created, encompassing the districts of Luanda, Cabinda, Uige, Zaire, Malange and Cuanza Norte, replacing the so-called "Northern Uprising Zone". Despite not existing still a conflict in this area, an Eastern Intervention Zone (ZIL) – covering the districts of Lunda and Moxico – is also created in the following month.

As part of his reforms, Minister Adriano Moreira decrees the repulsion of the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique on 6 August. With the abolition of this Statute, all Angolans, independently of their race, education, religion and costumes, achieve identical Portuguese citizenship rights and obligations.

On 10 April, the Operation Esmeralda (Emerald) – aimed at cleaning and retaking the control of Pedra Verde, UPA's last base in northern Angola – is initiated by the Special Caçadores Battalion 261, supported by paratroopers, artillery, armored cars and aviation elements. The initial assault is repulsed by the UPA forces, with the Portuguese suffering important casualties. The Portuguese regrouped and, days latter, launch a second assault, finally taking control of Pedra Verde on 16 September.

On 9 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 163, declaring Angola a non-self-governing territory and calling on Portugal to desist from repressive measures against the Angolan people. The resolution was approved with the votes of China, United States, Soviet Union and of all the non-permanent members, with the abstaining of France and the United Kingdom.[51]

The major military operations finally terminate on 3 October, when a platoon of the Artillery Company 100 reoccupies Caiongo, in the circle of Alto Cauale, Uíge, the last abandoned administrative post that remained unrecovered. This reoccupation ended the almost six months period during which the UPA fighters were able to control a geographic area with four times the size of European Portugal.

In a speech made on 7 October, the Governor-General and Commanding-in-Chief Venâncio Deslandes announces the termination of the military operations and that from then only police operations would be carried out, although partly in military scope.

During an air reconnaissance in southern Angola on 10 November, the aircraft that was carrying General Silva Freire and his staff crashes, killing him and almost all the officers of the headquarters of the land forces of Angola. Because of this crash, General Francisco Holbeche Fino is appointed commander of the 3rd Military Region.

In the first year of the war 20,000 to 30,000 Angolan civilians[22][52] were killed by Portuguese forces and between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees went to Zaïre. UPA militants joined pro-independence refugees and continued to launch attacks from across the border in Zaire, creating more refugees and terror among local communities.[38][47] A UPA patrol took 21 MPLA militants prisoners and then executed them on 9 October 1961 in the Ferreira incident, sparking further violence between the two sides.[47]

Holden Roberto merged UPA with the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA) to form the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in March 1962. A few weeks later he established the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) on 27 March, appointing Jonas Savimbi to the position of Foreign Minister. Roberto established a political alliance with Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko by divorcing his wife and marrying a woman from Mobutu's wife's village.[53][54] Roberto visited Israel and received aid from the Israeli government from 1963 to 1969.[55][56]

The MPLA held a party congress in Leopoldville in 1962, during which, Viriato da Cruz – found to be slow, negligent, and adverse to planning – was replaced by Agostinho Neto. In addition to the change in leadership, the MPLA adopted and reaffirmed its policies for an independent Angola:[35]

由於羅貝托不願將戰火蔓延至剛果王國以外的地區，薩文比於1964年離開安解陣並建立了安盟。[57]1965年，內圖與切·格瓦拉會面，很快得到了來自古巴、東德和蘇聯的資金支持。[58]

開啟東部戰線

In May 1966 Daniel Chipenda, then a member of MPLA, established the Frente Leste (Eastern Front), significantly expanding the MPLA's reach in Angola. When the EF collapsed, Chipenda and Neto each blamed the other's factions.[47]

UNITA carried out its first attack on 25 December 1966, preventing trains from passing through the 本格拉鐵路 at Teixeira de Sousa on the border with Zambia. 安盟在1967年又兩次毀壞鐵路，這惹惱了贊比亞政府，因為贊比亞通過這條鐵路出口銅產品。作為回應，贊比亞總統肯尼思·卡翁達下令驅逐安盟的500名軍事人員。Savimbi moved to Cairo, Egypt, where he lived for a year. 他從贊比亞秘密潛入安哥拉，and worked with the Portuguese military against the MPLA.[35][58]

UNITA had its main base in distant south-eastern Angolan provinces, where the Portuguese and FNLA influence were for all practical purposes very low, and where there was no guerrilla war at all. UNITA was from the beginning far better organized and disciplined than either the MPLA or the FNLA[59]. Its fighters also showed a much better understanding of guerrilla operations.[60] They were especially active along the Benguela railway, repeatedly causing damage to the Portuguese, and to the Republic of Congo and Zambia, both of which used the railway for transportation of their exports to Angolan ports.

On 19 May 1968, FNLA entered in Eastern Angola and carried away its first violent actions in the region against the local populations.

During October 1968, the Portuguese forces carry away Operation Vitória (Victory) against the MPLA, assaulting and destroying its main bases at Eastern Angola. Among others, the Mandume III base (headquarters of the MPLA's III Military Region) is assaulted by the Portuguese Commandos, leading to the capture of important documents.

During the late 1960s the FNLA and MPLA fought each other as much as they did the Portuguese, with MPLA forces assisting the Portuguese in finding FNLA hideouts.[58]

In the late 1969, the Portuguese forces organize the Battle Group Sirocco (Agrupamento Siroco), a highly mobile composite task force aimed at hunting and destroying the guerrilla forces operating in Eastern Angola. The land component of the task force is centered in Commando companies, being supported by an air component with helicopters and light aircraft. On 1 September, Battle Group Sirocco initiates a long series of highly successful operations in the Eastern region. Battle Group Sirocco (remodeled as Sirocco 1970 and Sirocco 1971, respectively in 1970 and 1971) would be active for three years, in 1972 being replaced by the similar Battle Group Ray (Agrupamento Raio).

葡萄牙重新聚焦東部

The MPLA began forming squadrons of 100 to 145 militants in 1971. These squadrons, armed with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, attacked Portuguese outposts. The Portuguese conducted counter-insurgency sweeps against MPLA forces in 1972, destroying some MPLA camps. Additionally, the South African Defence Force engaged the MPLA forces in Moxico in February 1972, destroying the Communist presence. The Portuguese Armed Forces organised a successful campaign to control and pacify the entire Eastern Front (the Frente Leste). Neto, defeated, retreated with 800 militants to the Republic of the Congo. Differing factions in the MPLA then jockeyed for power, until the Soviet Union allied with the Chipenda faction. On 17 March 1,000 FNLA fighters mutinied in Kinkuzu, but the Zairian army put down the rebellion on behalf of Roberto.[61]

 
1973年，安解陣士兵在扎伊爾營地訓練

In 1973 Chipenda left the MPLA, founding the Eastern Revolt with 1,500 former MPLA followers. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere convinced the People's Republic of China, which had begun funding the MPLA in 1970, to ally with the FNLA against the MPLA in 1973. Roberto visited the PRC in December and secured Chinese support. The Soviet Union cut off aid to the MPLA completely in 1974 when Revolta Activa split off from the mainstream MPLA. In November the Soviet Union resumed aid to the MPLA after Neto reasserted his leadership.[47][58]

1974年4月25日，葡萄牙軍隊中的一個中下級軍官組織「武裝部隊運動」發動康乃馨革命，終結了葡萄牙殖民地戰爭，讓葡萄牙的海外領地有了獨立的機會。[62][26][63]The MFA overthrew the Lisbon government in protest against the authoritarian political regime and the ongoing African colonial wars, specially the particularly demanding conflict in Portuguese Guinea.[64] The revolutionary Portuguese government removed the remaining elements of its colonial forces and agreed to a quick handover of power to the nationalist African movements. This put an immediate end to the independence war against Portugal, but opened the door for a bitter armed conflict among the independentist forces and their respectives allies. Holden Roberto, Agostinho Neto, and Jonas Savimbi met in Bukavu, Zaire in July and agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese as one political entity, but afterwards the fight broke out again.

結束

安人運、安解陣、安盟三黨領導於1975年1月5日，在肯雅蒙巴薩再次會晤，同意停止互相爭鬥，並準備和葡萄牙方面進行談判。1月10至15日，他們與葡萄牙政府官員在阿爾沃進行會議，會後簽訂阿爾沃協議（英語：Alvor Agreement），確定安哥拉將於11月11日獨立，並組建過渡政府。[65]

協議的簽訂標誌着獨立戰爭的結束，和局勢開始向內戰的轉變。卡賓達飛地解放陣線（英語：Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda）和東部叛亂武裝沒能參與談判和簽訂協議。與此同時，聯合政府很快就fell as nationalist factions, doubting one another's commitment to the peace process, tried to take control of the colony by force.[38][65]

The parties agreed to hold the first assembly elections in October 1975. From 31 January until independence a transitional government consisting of the Portuguese High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho and a Prime Ministerial Council would rule. The PMC consisted of three representatives, one from each Angolan party, and a rotating premiership among the representatives. Every decision required two-thirds majority support. The twelve ministries were divided equally among the Angolan parties and the Portuguese government: three ministries for each party. Author Witney Wright Schneidman criticized this provision in Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire for ensuring a "virtual paralysis in executive authority". The Bureau of Intelligence and Research cautioned that an excessive desire to preserve the balance of power in the agreement hurt the transitional Angolan government's ability to function.[38][65][66]

The Portuguese government's main goal in negotiations was preventing the mass emigration of white Angolans. Paradoxically, the agreement only allowed the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to nominate candidates to the first assembly elections, deliberately disenfranchising Bakongo, Cabindans, and whites. The Portuguese reasoned that white Angolans would have to join the separatist movements and the separatists would have to moderate their platforms to expand their political bases.[66]

The agreement called for the integration of the militant wings of the Angolan parties into a new military, the Angolan Defense Forces. The ADF would have 48,000 active personnel, made up of 24,000 Portuguese and 8,000 MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fighters respectively. Each party maintained separate barracks and outposts. Every military decision required the unanimous consent of each party's headquarters and the joint military command. The Portuguese forces lacked equipment and commitment to the cause, while Angolan nationalists were antagonistic of each other and lacked training.[65][66] The treaty, to which the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) never agreed, described Cabinda as an "integral and inalienable part of Angola". Separatists viewed the agreement as a violation of Cabindan right to self-determination.[67]

All three parties soon had forces greater in number than the Portuguese, endangering the colonial power's ability to keep the peace. Factional fighting renewed, reaching new heights as foreign supplies of arms increased. In February the Cuban government warned the Eastern Bloc that the Alvor Agreement would not succeed. By spring the African National Congress and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were echoing Cuba's warning.[68] Leaders of the Organization of African Unity organized a peace conference moderated by Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta with the three leaders in Nakuru, Kenya in June. The Angolan leaders issued the Nakuru Declaration on 21 June,[69] agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Alvor Agreement while acknowledging a mutual lack of trust which led to violence.

In July fighting again broke out and the MPLA managed to force the FNLA out of Luanda; UNITA voluntarily withdrew from the capital to its stronghold in the south from where it also engaged in the struggle for the country. By August the MPLA had control of 11 of the 15 provincial capitals, including Cabina and Luanda.[70] On 12 August, Portugal began airlifting more than 200,000 white Portuguese Angolans from Luanda to Lisbon, via "Operation Air Bridge". South African forces invaded Angola on 23 October 1975,[71] covertly sending 1,500 to 2,000 troops from Namibia into southern Angola. FNLA-UNITA-South African forces took five provincial capitals, including Novo Redondo and Benguela in three weeks. On 10 November the Portuguese left Angola. Cuban-MPLA forces defeated South African-FNLA forces, maintaining control over Luanda. On 11 November Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.[65] The FNLA and UNITA responded by proclaiming their own government based in Huambo.[19] The South African Army retreated and, with the help of Cuban forces, the MPLA retook most of the south in the beginning of 1976.

Many analysts have blamed the transitional government in Portugal for the violence that followed the Alvor Agreement, criticizing the lack of concern about internal Angolan security, and the favoritism towards the MPLA. High Commissioner Coutinho, one of the seven leaders of the National Salvation Junta, openly gave Portuguese military equipment to MPLA forces.[19][65][66] Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the United States State Department, told Tom Killoran, the U.S. Consul General in Angola, to congratulate the PMC rather than the FNLA and UNITA on their own and Coutinho for Portugal's "untiring and protracted efforts" at a peace agreement.[66][72] Secretary of State Henry Kissinger considered any government involving the pro-Soviet, communist MPLA, to be unacceptable and President Gerald Ford oversaw heightened aid to the FNLA.[35]

外國的影響

美國

安哥拉的衝突很快讓許多外國勢力，尤其是葡萄牙的北約盟國們擔心起來。比如美國就擔心安哥拉可能會建立起共產主義國家，因此其開始向安哥拉人民聯盟（安解陣）提供武器彈藥支持。[73]

然而安解陣的領導人不滿足於美國提供的支持。薩文比和中華人民共和國建立了良好關係，從中國得來的物資比美國輸送的還要多。1965年初，美國批准圖森的Aero Associates公司向葡萄牙出售7架A-26入侵者轟炸機（英語：Douglas B-26 Invader），儘管葡萄牙擔心該公司支持來自古巴和蘇聯的共產黨人。

這7架轟炸機由據報為前英國皇家空軍的約翰·理查德·霍克（John Richard Hawke）執飛前往安哥拉。在其中一次飛行中由於他飛越白宮時距離太低，被美國空軍截停並逮捕。1965年5月霍克被控對葡萄牙非法出售武器，但只入獄了不到一年。這批轟炸機直到數年後才在安哥拉得到部署。[74]

羅德西亞、南非

除了美國之外，羅德西亞和南非這兩個白人政府領導的非洲國家也參與了戰爭。兩國政府擔心若葡萄牙戰敗，其處境將往負面的方向發展。起初這兩國的參與僅限於運輸武器和補給，但1968年南非開始向葡萄牙空軍提供雲雀III型直升機和機組人員，到後來更是直接把南非國防軍的幾個步兵連派往安哥拉的中南部。[75]有報道稱南非國防軍曾負責守衛卡辛加（英語：Cassinga）的鐵礦，但沒有被證實。

曾有報告稱，一批羅德西亞飛行員被招募來駕駛葡萄牙空軍的直升機。然而，當1969年葡萄牙空軍剛剛開始裝備SA330美洲獅直升機時，機組人員基本都來自南非。羅德西亞空軍認為本國的飛行員很重要，不能派去支援葡萄牙。南非支援的飛行員和直升機不受葡萄牙聯合空中支援中心（Centro Conjunto de Apoio Aéreo）的控制。

蘇聯

20世紀60年代末，蘇聯開始通過安人運介入安哥拉的戰爭。此時安解陣只能從美國得到十分有限的武器，安盟幾乎沒從國外得到什麼支持，而安人運因為和莫斯科方面發展了親近的關係，很快就開始通過坦桑尼亞、贊比亞得到大量的武器。[76][77]

1969年，安人運和蘇聯達成協議，以獨立後蘇聯能在安哥拉境內建造軍事基地為條件，換取蘇聯向其交付武器和物資。因此到20世紀70年代初，安人運就成為了安哥拉最大的反殖民組織和最強大的政黨。

後續

在安人運和葡萄牙籤署權力移交協議的消息流出之後，大批人員開始逃離安哥拉。11月，超過30萬人搭乘葡萄牙航空航班前往別國，另有約6,000人登上英國皇家航空的飛機離境。At this stage, the Angolan Civil War had started and spread out across the newly independent country. The devastating civil war lasted several decades and claimed a million lives and refugees in independent Angola.[78]

In the wake of the conflict, Angola faced deterioration in central planning, economic development and growth, security, education and health system issues.和其他剛從葡萄牙殖民地戰爭獨立的國家相似，安哥拉的人類發展指數和人均GDP都顯著下降。獨立後的社會經濟衰退、政治腐敗、貧窮與貧富差距拉大，以及計劃經濟的失敗，使得獨立後的安哥拉與當初的設想差距甚遠。[79][80] A level of economic development comparable to what had existed under Portuguese rule became a major goal for the governments of the independent territory. The sharp recession and the chaos in many areas of Angolan life eroded the initial impetus of nationalistic fervor. There were also eruptions of black racism in the former overseas province against white and mulatto Angolans.[81]

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外部連結

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